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Arnold: Class Actions in Florida--A New Look

CLASS ACTIONS IN FLORIDA-A NEW LOOK
RIcHARD ALAN ARoim*
INTRODUCflON

Very few areas of the law have inspired as much comment as class actions.1
The class action device has been described by its advocates as "one of the most
socially useful remedies in history," 2 and by its critics as an "engine of destruction" 3 and "a form of legalized blackmail." 4 Although much criticism has been
directed at selected uses of class actions, 5 some jurisdictions have transformed
the device into an effective means of enforcing substantive policies 6 by overcoming inequities in the adversary system. 7 Despite the volumes of literature on
class actions8 and the relevant federal rule, 9 Florida's class action rule'O has
*B.S. 1969, East Tennessee State University; J.D. 1973, University of South Carolina; LL.M.
1975, University of Illinois; Member of the Florida Bar.

1. An examination of the entries to the Index to Legal Periodicals gives an indication of
the increasing comment on this subject. Volumes 71 and 72, covering the period from July 19,
1977 through Dec. 19, 1978, include 78 articles concerning class actions. The volumes covering

the period of January 1976 through August 1977, had 59 articles dealing with the subject. See
Developments in the Law - Class Actions, 89 HAv. L. REv. 1318, 1325 n.15 (1976) [hereinafter
I
cited as Developments].
2. Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions-Has Their Death Knell Been
Sounded, 25 Bus. LAW. 1259, 1259 (1970).
3. Simon, Class Actions- Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1973).
4. Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits The Twenty-Third Antitrust Review, 71 CoLuM. L. REv. 1, 9 (1971).
5. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the
Substance-ProcedureDilemma,47 S. CALF. L. REv. 842 (1974).
6. The substantive policies underlying a particular cause of action can often be furthered
as a direct result of the more widespread relief available in class action suits. Additionally,
enforcement of substantive policies is not as easily thwarted when small claims are aggregated
under the class device. See generally Landers, supra note 5.
7. For example, the adversary system is based on the premise that opponents are equally
matched in terms of economic resources and legal representation. Class actions can equalize
disparate power by allowing similarly situated individuals to consolidate their relatively
meager resources in prosecuting their causes of action.
8. See generally Moore, The Potential Function of the Modern Class Suit, 2 CLASS AcM.
RFP.47 (1973); Developments, supra note 1; Note, State Class Action Statutes: A Comparative
Analysis, 60 IowA L. REv. 93 (1974); Comment, The Progressive Transformation of Class
Action in California,12 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 186 (1974).
9. FFa. R. Civ. P. 23. See generally Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:
1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure I, 81 HARv. L. RIv. 356 (1967);
Kaplan, Prefatory Note, The Class Action-A Symposium, I0 B.C. INDUS. & Com. L. Rev.
497 (1969); Note, The Rule 23(bX3) Class Action: An EmpiricalStudy, 62 GEo. L.J. 1123 (1974).
10. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.220. The class action device is available for forming either plaintiff
or defendant classes. This article addresses the use of both types of classes in Florida; however,
most of the general comments about class actions are directed toward plaintiff classes. The
vast majority of the class actions in Florida and the federal system have involved plaintiff
classes. See generally Parsons & Starr, Environmental Litigation and Defendant Class Actions:
The Unrealized Viability of Rule 23, 4 EcoLoGy. L.Q. 881 (1975).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [1979], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI

been largely ignored by commentators'1 and courts alike. As a result, this area
of Florida law remains ambiguous and confused.
2
The original text of the Florida class action rule has survived unchanged,'
despite the increasing complexity of modern class action litigation. Couched in
broad, timeless language, the rule provides no concrete guidance to litigants
and judges of the Florida courts. Rule 1.220(a) provides: "When the question
is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a class so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one
13
or more may sue or defend for the whole."'
The Florida supreme court's merger of law and equity with the adoption of
revised rules of civil procedure in 1966 failed to anticipate the impact of the
symbiosis of law and equity on class actions.' 4 Despite using the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure as a model for the Florida rules in general, 15 the court retained the exact language of Florida Equity Rule 14 governing class actions - a
rule modeled after Federal Equity Rule 38.16 The court's rubber stamp adoption of Florida Equity Rule 14 ignored the fate of its federal counterpart.
Federal Equity Rule 38 was altered substantially in 1937 when the federal
courts first merged law and equity and was revised again in 1966 when the
7
original language proved inadequate.
The Florida cases, attempting to apply a rule applicable only to suits in
equity,' 8 have further compounded the problem by a lack of in-depth analysis
11. One commentator has reviewed the Florida class action rule in depth. See Note, Class
Suits, 9 U. FLA. L. REv. 75 (1956).
12. In 1977, the Florida supreme court in Avila S. Condominium Ass'n. v. Kappa Corp.,
347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977) amended FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(b) to give condominium associations
standing to maintain or defend an action on behalf of the condominium unit owners concerning matters of common interest. This amendment does nothing to aid the analysis of class
action cases.
13. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a).
14. The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted on June 15, 1966, to be effective
midnight Dec. 31, 1966. In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 1967 Revision, 187 So. 2d 598
(Fla. 1966).
15. Committee Notes, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.010.
16. The Committee Notes to rule 1.220 simply cite equity rule 14 without comment. The
federal and Florida classification rules use identical language. See FED. EQurrY R. 38; FLA.
EQUITY R. 14; FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220(a).
17. In 1937 the United States Supreme Court merged law and equity in the federal courts.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1. In adopting rules of procedure for all civil actions in law and equity, the
Court adopted rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to replace rule 38 of the
Federal Equity Rules. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure restated the equity
rule as it had been interpreted through court decisions, and abandoned the vague language of
rule 38 for a functional approach which characterized those situations in which use of the
class action device would be proper. Original rule 23 attempted to provide guidance as to the
type of litigation in which the use of the class action device was appropriate; however, between
1937 and 1966 it became apparent that substantial revision was necessary. See Z. CHAFFEE,
SOME PROBLEMS OF EQurrY 199-255 (1950).
18. A major difference between law and equity is the right to trial by jury in cases at
law. There is no right to trial by jury on issues of fact which are within the province of a
court of equity. Lincoln Tower Corp. v. Dunhall's -Florida, Inc., 61 So. 2d 474, 476 (Fla.
1952). The trial of cases before juries which present complex problems of proof are plagued
with procedural and logistical difficulties that are not present in non-jury trials. For example,
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concerning the purpose, scope and application of class actions. These decisions
reflect an undue allegiance to the community of interest theory as the sole
justification for the use of the class action device. 9 An examination of the
Florida decisions interpreting the language of rule 1.220 and its predecessors
clearly reveals that the rule must be redrafted by the Florida supreme court to
address the ambiguities caused by the deceptively simple language.
This article examines the historical and theoretical basis of the class action
device in an attempt to establish an analytical structure with which to assess
the present status of the Florida law. After studying the theoretical and functional status of Florida class action law, the article proposes a more comprehensive class action rule for Florida.
HISTORY OF CLAss ACTIoNs

Necessity was the progenitor of the class action device.20 The generally accepted rule of the English courts of Chancery compelled joinder of all interested parties before a court could act. Strict application of the joinder rule
often precluded judgment when the interested parties were too numerous to
appear before the court at one time. Thus, the class action device known as
the bill of peace 21 was conceived to avoid the harshness of the joinder rule.
Indeed, early English cases allowed representative actions under bills of peace
where joinder was impracticable or impossible.22
From this Anglican heritage, the class action device received its introduction
into American courts of equity in 1820 with Mr. Justice Story's opinion in
West v. Randall.2s The West court felt that all persons materially interested as
plaintiffs or defendants in the subject matter of the bill should be parties regardless of their number.24 For Justice Story, the social utility of the class device
when a case is tried to a jury as opposed to non-jury litigation, the presentation of evidence
tends to be more formal, the trial must be conducted on a more or less nonstop, consecutive
daily basis, and the finder of fact is not allowed to use a spedal master to make detailed
factual determinations. All of these problems tend to be accentuated in class action litigation.
When these procedural complexities are coupled with the increased opportunity for use of the
class device with its availability in actions at law, the impotency of the Florida rule in meeting
the new challenges is not surprising.
19. The community of interest theory, an outgrowth of the antiquated doctrine of privity
is discussed herein. See text accompanying notes 50-53 infra. The theory's apparent supremacy
in Florida class action cases can be partially attributed to the language of rule 1.220 of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
20. "The class action was an invention of equity... mothered by the practical necessity
of providing a procedural device so that mere numbers would not disable large groups of
individuals united in interest, from enforcing their equitable rights nor grant them immunity
from their equitable wrongs." Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir.
1948).
21. Just as Mr. Justice Story later articulated the concept of the class action in the United
States, Lord Eldon formulated the requirements for a bill of peace in the English courts. See
Cockburn v. Thompson, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005, 1007 (Ch. 1809).
22. City of London v. Richmond, 2 Ver. 421 (1701), (involved almost 1,000 potential
defendants); Quintine v. Yard, 1 Equity Cases Abr. 74 (1702) (involved necessary parties who
resided without the jurisdiction of the court, thereby making joinder impossible).
23. 29 Fed. Cas. (No. 17,424) 718 (C.C.RJ. 1820).
24. id. at 721.
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was in the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits25 and in the heuristic function of
the class action.2 6 The United States Supreme Court 27 and numerous state
legislatures-5 adopted the equity class action practice formulated by the
Justice,2 9 and the concept was reduced to a rule of equity for the federal courts
in 1842.30 The 1912 versions- of Federal Equity Rule 38 in turn served as the
model for the original Florida class action rule,3 2 which has remained un83
changed.
THEORIES OF CLASS ACTIONS

The law of class actions is essentially a procedural doctrine of convenience.
The device protects society from the undesirable effects of permitting litigants
to inundate the courts with essentially identical claims, or alternatively of
allowing a wrongdoer to escape liability merely because the potential claimants
25. Id.
26. Id. "[The class device] may make it perfectly certain that no injustice shall be done,
either to the parties before the court, or to others, who are interested by a decree, that may
be grounded upon a partial view only of the real merits." Id.
27. Smith v. Swornstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853). The Supreme Court's adoption of
the class action doctrine was, however, limited to classes based on a community of interest.
The United States Supreme Court expressly rejected a further suggestion by Mr. Justice Story
that a class suit may be brought where numerous parties have separate and distinct interests.
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS §97 (3d ed. 1844).
28.

E.g., C.

CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING

§63, at 396-404 (2d ed. 1947).

29. For a detailed history of the development of the class action device in Anglo-American
jurisprudence, see Z. CHAFFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY (1950); Developments in the Law Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REv. 874 (1958).
30. The first federal class action rule was Federal Equity Rule 48, which provided: "Where
the parties on either side are very numerous and cannot, without manifest inconvenience and
oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the Court in its discretion may dispense
with making all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having sufficient parties before
it to represent all of the adverse interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit
properly before it. But, in such cases, the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and
claims of all the absent parties."
31. Federal Equity Rule 38 involved one substantive change from its predecessor, Federal
Equity Rule 48. The English practice reflected in rule 48 had been to treat a class action
judgment as binding on all class members. The 1912 version deleted that concept which had
caused great confusion over the res judicata effect on class members not made parties to the
action. The deletion left the problem unaddressed. Compare Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255
U.S. 356 (1921) (decree must bind all class members) with Christopher v. Brusselback, 302
U.S. 500 (1938) (decree binds only absentee interests in property within jurisdiction). Until
the 1966 amendment to rule 23, the res judicata effect of class action judgments remained uncertain. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(3).
32. 1931 Fla. Laws, ch. 14658, §14.
33. Despite enabling legislation, the belated merger of law and equity in Florida courts,
and the Florida supreme court's constitutional prerogative to formulate rules of procedure
pursuant to FLA. CONST. art. V, §3, the original Florida class action rule has remained unchanged.
In 1949, the Florida supreme court adopted rules of civil procedure. FLA. R. COMMON L. &
EQUITY (1949). The court adopted a new set of civil rules in 1954 but preserved the distinction
between law and equity until 1966 with In re Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1967 Revision,
187 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1966).
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are too numerous. The doctrine has been treated as a practical device devoid
of the abstractions which abound in the more theoretical areas of substantive
law. 34
By avoiding theory in favor of more concrete premises, the drafters of the
current federal class action rule35 sought "to assure the fair conduct of [class]
actions."3 The drafters placed great reliance on judicial discretion as the
vehicle with which the representative action would obtain that fairness. However, the absence of a theoretical basis for the rule has left trial judges with no
guidelines by which to exercise such discretion. 37 This paradox doomed
the approach to failure3s The dilemma is magnified in Florida, where reliance
on broad judicial discretion is mandated by a class action rule that espouses
neither theoretical underpinnings nor pragmatism.
Before assessing the current status of Florida class action law and considering suggestions for reformation, it is necessary to examine the broad theories
underlying the use of the class action device. 39 These theories provide the basis
for understanding the gradual metamorphosis of the class action device from
its English origins in Cockburn v. Thompson 40 to its present state in the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.41

34. The authors of revised federal rule 23 avoided abstractions which tended to be
"obschre and uncertain." Advisory Committee Note, 39 F.R.D. 69,98 (1966).
35, FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
36. Letter of Chairman Mitchell to the Chief Justice, Preliminary Draft (May, 1966) ix.

37. Rule 23 has been criticized by commentators both for its limitation and its expansion
of access to the courts by class members who would not otherwise litigate individually. Compare Landers, supra note 5, with Handler, supra note 4. Despite their disagreement, both
camps agree that rule 23 has failed in its attempt to ensure the fair conduct of class actions.
38. The undisciplined exercise of discretion by the courts in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156 (1974), is an example of the rule's inability to provide courts with a practical
basis upon which to exercise their discretion. See note 41 infra.
39. See text accompanying notes 50-63 infra. A class action rule should contain requirements which can be divided roughly into two separate categories. First, there are the class
prerequisites which are to be used in determining the situations in which the use of the class
action device is justified. Second, there are the procedural requirements which govern the administration of the class litigation. The discussion herein concerning class action theories is
related to the former category; the functional analysis is related to the latter category.
40. 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (Ch. 1809).
41. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The history of Eisen exemplifies the complexity of a modern
class action. As an antitrust and securities suit brought on behalf of all buyers and sellers of
odd lots on the New York Stock Exchange, the class included six million individuals. Two
million of these could reasonably be identified by name and address. This litigation resulted
in numerous decisions, with the expenditure of enormous amounts of judicial time.
There are eight xeported decisions in the Eisen case. The federal district court originally
denied it class action status. Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967). The court of appeals held the order appealable. 370 F.2d 119 (2d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967) (Eisen I). The court of appeals then reversed the
trial court's denial of class action status and remanded the case for further consideration. 391
F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (Eisen II). On remand, the district court rendered three opinions
which culminated in its decision that the fluid class recovery was authorized, 50 F.R.D. 471
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); that notice could be given to a small group of class members, 52 F.R.D. 253
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); and that defendants should pay 90% of the cost of the notice because they
were likely to lose on the merits, 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The court of appeals again
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The anachronistic concept of privity, now reflected in the community of
interest, consent, and substantive theories of class actions is the controlling historical philosophy for the class action device.4 2 Privity required, at the outset, a
substantive relationship or connection between the parties.43 Privity's reign
began with the United States Supreme Court's rejection in Smith v. Swornstedt"4 of Justice Story's suggestion that representative actions can be maintained where parties have separate and distinct interest. The doctrine gradually
5
became the dominant restrictive influence in class action practice' maintainreversed. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.), rehearing denied, 479 F.2d 1020 (1973) (Eisen III), vacated
and remanded, 417 U.S. 158 (1974). The United States Supreme Court held that the class
action rule does not give a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the
merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action. Such a
preliminary examination was deemed violative of the federal rule in that it would allow a
representative plaintiff to secure the benefits of a class action without first satisfying the rule's
requirements. 417 U.S. at 177-78.
Eisen is an excellent example of the confusion which can reign under a rule as superficially explicit as rule 23. It is correspondingly easy to appreciate the difficulties facing Florida
courts in attempting to handle class litigation with the minimal guidance provided by rule
1.220.
42. See generally Developments, supra note 1, at 1329-72. There is perhaps a fourth theory
of class actions which states that class actions are proper when they serve to avoid multiplicity
of law suits, conserve judicial time and reduce litigation expenses to society. For this theory to
have any practical application, these factors must be considered with the substantive policies
underlying the cause of action; therefore, this theory could be called the "quasi-substantive"
theory. For the substantive theory to have practical application, it must encompass the "quasisubstantive" theory. These two theories are, therefore, treated together in this article.
43. The precise nature of the relationship required to establish privity is not entirely
clear. However defined, the requirement of privity denotes a common ground among persons
which removes them from the classifications of legal strangers. In class actions, privity requires
a community of interest among the class members in the subject matter of the litigation. See
Meier v. Johnson, 110 Fla. 374, 149 So. 185 (1933).
44. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 228 (1854).
45. The privity concept formed the basis of original rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which was adopted in 1938. This rule provided in part:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the
adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of
the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce the right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of the claims which do or
may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and
a common relief is sought.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (1938).
The terms "joint", "common", or "several" are labels for depicting jural relationships.
Indeed, even the "several" right, or "spurious" class as it came to be known, required common
relief to be sought before a spurious class could be maintained. The use of these labels appears
to be an ill-defined attempt to ensure that there is some sort of substantive connection among
the class members. This is consistent with the concept of privity.
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ing its grip on the law of class actions 46 long after it declined in other areas of
the law.4 7 Nevertheless, the artificiality and inflexibility of the privity concept
does not square with the modem legal thinking's inclination to consider the
daily realities of factual patterns in the search for workable remedial doctrines.
The courts' long-held allegiance to this antiquated concept in class action case
48
analysis can be attributed to the doctrine's vagueness. That vagueness, coupled
with a lack of understanding of the purpose and utility of the class suit, has
stunted attempts at innovative reform of the class action device.
In reviewing class action cases, identification of the theory underlying the
class action often reveals whether a court's analysis is mired in the privity requirement. The use of privity as the one essential ingredient in maintaining a
class action suit unduly restricts the use of the device and effectively deprives
society of a potentially useful tool. Three theories - community of interest,
consent and substantive - support expanded application of the class action
device.
Community of Interest
The majority of Florida and pre-1966 federal court decisions attempted to
satisfy the privity requirement of homogeneity by affirmatively demonstrating
uniformity of interest among all putative class members.49 The community of
interest theory, dominant in Florida case law, derives from the doctrine of
privity. The term "community of interest" represents the most common of
several conceptualizations used by courts to determine if the putative class
members possess the requisite privity to justify the use of the class action device.
It is premised on the notion that the class action device cannot be used unless
all of the persons on whose behalf the suit is brought have "one common interest in all the objects of the suit."5 0 Under this theory the class unit is an entity
distinct from the individuals of which it is composed. This type of class derives
5
its existence from the nature of the rights of the class members ' rather than
from the discretion of the court or the option of the class members.
46. The concept of privity under the banner of the community of interest theory dominated class action law until the early 1960's. Maryland was the first American jurisdiction to
abandon privity as the basis requirement for the maintenance of a class action. See MD. R.
Civ. P. 209 (1961). The federal courts did not abandon the concept until the 1966 version of

rule 23.

47. "Privity" has played a central role in the development of Anglo-American legal
doctrines. Roscoe round acknowledged its influence when he stated: "Anglo-American law is
pervaded on every hand by the idea of relation and of legal consequences flowing therefrom.... So completely has this idea taken possession of equity that more than one subject,
for example, interpleader and bills of peace, is embarrassed by a struggle to find some relation
to which the right to relief may be annexed." R. POUND, THE SPnur oF THE COMMON LAW 22,
25 (1921).
48. See City of Miami Beach v. Tenney, 7 So. 2d 136, 141 (Fla. 1942).
49. E.g., Imperial Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Brown, 338 So. 2d 1081, 1084 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1976). See also FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.220.
50. F. CALVERT, PARTES To Suns m EQurrY 42 (2d ed. 1847).
51. FD. R. Civ. P. 23 illustrates this jural relationship by utilizing three categories
labeled "true", "hybrid" and "spurious." See note 45 supra. Florida perhaps avoided the influences of the ill-fated reign of original rule 23 by its delay in merging the courts of law and
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Most narrowly defined, community of interest refers to a joint interest in
the subject matter of the litigation. In its broadest definition it can mean a
common interest in an issue involved in the litigation. While community of
interest is anchored in the doctrine of privity, varying interpretations of what
constitutes "one common interest" would seem to suggest that the restrictiveness of privity's mechanistic approach has been reduced. This positive trend is
negated if the community of interest test, regardless of the breadth of its definition, is made an essential precondition to use of the class device. The result
would be nothing more than a rewording of the familiar privity notion and
delay of further development.
Class action suits justified by the community of interest theory bind the
class members whether or not the class device actually was used. The type of
case which qualifies for class action treatment under the community of interest
theory is founded in factual situations which, in practical effect, bind nonparties, although those parties are not legally classified as class members. 2 This
53
could be referred to as class action by necessity.
Consent
The consent theory, the second theory of class suits, 5 4 is antithetical to the

community of interest theory insofar as it holds that the decisions of individual 55 class members to intervene56 or to opt out, 57 rather than the nature of
equity. By the time Florida had the occasion to consider the procedural reforms wrought by
merging law and equity, the United States Supreme Court had adopted revised rule 23, which
abandoned jural relationships as the basis for determining the propriety of a class action. See
note 9 supra.
52. See, e.g., Dunscombe v. Smith, 139 Fla. 497, 190 So. 796 (1939) (joint interest in trust
fund); Meier v. Johnson, 110 Fla. 374, 149 So. 185 (1933) (joint interest in mortgage).
53. Necessity has been referred to herein as the "progenitor of the class action device."
See text accompanying note 20 supra. In an entirely different sense, necessity has also been
responsible for much of the device's expansion within the confines of the community of interest
theory. Under the influence of the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, courts
applying the community of interest theory have expanded class actions to include a common
interest in an issue because of the practical effect of binding the absent class members. See,
e.g., City of Miami v. Keton, 115 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1959).
54. The consent theory was not acknowledged by the drafters of the 1938 or 1966 federal
class action rule. However, the common question sections of the 1938 and 1966 rules implicitly
rely on the consent theory as a basis for their existence. See Developments, supra note 1, at
1338.
55. Id. at 1330-31. The community of interest theory is an objective manifestation of the
unity of interest among class members. The consent theory measures such unity subjectively,
but both theories treat class actions as ordinary bipolar litigation consisting of an individual
plaintiff and individual defendant.
56. The spurious class of original rule 23 was designed to derive its usefulness principally
as a permissive joinder rule. See Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems
Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551 (1937). Only actual parties and intervenors
were bound by judgments in spurious class cases. Intervention was allowed even after judgment. The legitimacy of this permissive joinder rule in spurious class actions was based on
the consent theory. Id. at 555.
57. Revised rule 23 was intended to correct the perceived unfairness of liberal intervention
permitted by original rule 23. See Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for
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the substantive right asserted, is the best indicator of whether the litigation is
properly suited for class action treatment. The consent theory, like the community of interest theory, treats the class action suit as ordinary litigation. 5s
Responsibility for regulation and protection of the public policy concerns of
fairness and effective enforcement of final judgments is delegated to the individuals who determine the composition of their class. This allows class members rather than courts to determine whether the use of class procedures is
consistent with the individual rights at issue in the cause of action.
The consent theory explains, in part, the machinations which the rulemakers have gone through in attempting to change the ancient representative
action from a rule of necessity to an instrument of social policy that is laden
with institutional and societal value judgments. It represents an attempt to
expand the application of the socially useful representative action without
addressing the inconsistency between this type of lawsuit and the recognition
of personal rights inherent in an individual cause of action. The major failing
of this theory is that the interests of the class opponent and third parties are
not protected. Since the qualitative judgments concerning the propriety of a
class action are based upon participation in the class by consenting class members, neither opponents nor third parties figure into the class action calculus.
They have no reasonable expectation that the partisan class would consider
their interests unless those interests are coextensive.
Substantive
A third major justification for the use of the class action device is the substantive theory. This approach recognizes that the class action's function is to
give full realization to society's substantive policies by opening the courts to
causes of action not ordinarily litigated and affording the court a better overview of the impact which particular results would have on the substantive
policies underlying the causes of action.59 The substantive theory narrows the
analytical focus from the merits of class actions in general to the acceptability
of a class action in each cause of action. The fundamental determination which
must be made under the substantive theory is whether the use of the class action
device comports with the policies underlying the particular cause of action.
This determination mandates a case-by-case analysis. Under the substantive
theory, the class action rule serves merely as a set of guidelines to be applied by
the courts. The responsibility to assure that the substantive policies underlying
the cause of action lead to an equitable result rests solely with the court6 0
The three theories above are helpful in understanding the changes which
the United States District Courts, 39 F.R.D. 73, 105-06 (1966). The consent theory, though unacknowledged, continued its influence through the revised rule. Liberal intervention in common question class actions was replaced with individualized notice and the opportunity to
"opt out" of participation in the class action. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Thus, the decision
as to the propriety of the class is not based on the nature of the substantive right but on
whether the individual class members chose to participate and be bound by the judgment.
58. See Development, supra note 1, at 1338.

59. Id. at 1353.
60. For an in-depth discussion of the substantive theory, see id. at 1353-72.
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have occurred in the development of the class action device.61 From its use by
the equity courts to avoid the harsh inequitable results of a strict jurisdictional
rule, 62 the class action device has occasionally developed into an ingenious
method of enforcing substantive policies. Each of the three theories has provided an essential building block in the development of the class action
mechanism. Together, the theories form the analytical framework under which
Florida decisions must be considered and aid in the creation of a new Florida
class action rule. 63
COMMUNITY OF INTEREST PREVAILS IN FLORIDA

While all three theories have contributed to the development of the class action device, the community of interest theory, with its attendant limitations, has
served as the major theoretical justification for the use of the class action device
in Florida. From Meier v. Johnson 4 in 1933 to date, the Florida courts have
insisted on a community of interest among the class members before a class
action can be maintained. The early cases65 adopted the most conservative
interpretation of the interest test - joint interest in the subject matter of the
litigation among the class members - while late cases tended to liberalize the
definition of interest by focusing on identity of particular issues.
The historical domination of the joint interest test in Florida decisions is
best illustrated by the Florida supreme court's decision in Osceola Groves, Inc.
v. Wiley.6 Osceola Groves involved a lawsuit by two lot purchasers brought on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated against the corporation
which had sold the property to them.67 The defendant corporation sold 394
61. The purpose in the development of the theories is to provide a theoretical justification
for the existence of the class action device; however, certain types of classes can be justified by
more than one theory. For example, actions in which the litigation of the rights of one party
will for all practical purposes litigate the rights of a group of similarly situated persons,
referred to herein as a "class by necessity," is most often justified under the community of
interest theory. See, e.g., Dunscombe v. Smith, 39 Fla. 497, 190 So. 796 (1939). Actions in
which there are numerous other similarly situated individuals concerned with similar factual
or legal issues, referred to herein as a "common question" class, is most often justified under
the consent or substantive theories; however, depending on the number of common issues in
the rights being litigated this type of class might also be a "class by necessity." See Frankel v.
City of Miami Beach, 340 So. 2d 463, 465 (Fla. 1976).
62. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
63. See proposed rule in text following note 248 infra.
64. 110 Fla. 374, 149 So. 185 (1933). This case involved a suit by an unincorporated association for the foreclosure of a mortgage. The interest of the class members was joint. Id. at
376, 149 So. at 185. This type of case is the grist of the community of interest theory mill. If
society could afford to limit the utility of the class device to these type of cases, there would
be no need to reform rule 1.220.
65. See two of the earliest cases, Dunscombe v. Smith, 139 Fla. 497, 190 So. 796 (1939), and
Meier v. Johnson, 110 Fla. 374, 149 So. 185 (1933). In Dunscombe, the Florida supreme court
affirmed an equitable decree on behalf of all persons who were depositors in the Stuart Bank
& Trust Co. at the time of its first closing. The joint interest was in a $5,900 trust fund created
by the stipulation that the liquidated bank had sufficient funds on hand to satisfy the $84,000
due the class members. 139 Fla. at 498-99, 190 So. at 797.
66. 78 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1955).
67. Id. at 704.
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units in a subdivided tract of land for $1,000 each to numerous persons. Each
signed a sale and leaseback agreement in which the defendant promised to
establish and maintain fruit groves on the lots and share the profits with the
plaintiff owners. 68 The plaintiffs specifically alleged fraud, claiming that defendant improperly manipulated the expenses of maintaining and operating
each lot so as to deprive the purchasers of income from the lot. The plaintiffs
sued for an accounting and other relief. In holding that a class could not be
maintained on these facts alleging fraud, the Florida supreme court was unable
to find any community of interest between the two plaintiffs or any common
ground upon which the plaintiffs could join in building a single action on
behalf of the class of purchasers. 69
The controlling factors in Osceola Groves included the lack of cooperative
enterprise and a joint pecuniary interest among the class members and the
availability of alternative remedies. 70 The first two factors were characteristic of
the conservative joint interest test to determine community of interest.73 The
third factor, which reflected a value judgment by the court, gave priority to the
interests of the possible class defectors and dissidents over the broad public
interest in enforcing the social policies on which the action was based72
Osceola Groves was readily embraced in other Florida decisions. However,
widespread application of the community of interest definition in Osceola
Groves completely disregarded the fact that that case involved allegations of
fraud. During the unchallenged reign of Osceola Groves, courts held fast to the
requirement that class members must have a joint interest in the subject matter
of the litigation before a class action could be maintained in commercial interest litigation. 3
An illustration of the tyranny of the unrestrained application of the Osceola

Groves rule is Sams v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.1 4 In Sams, a former employee
sued Winn-Dixie to recover employee profit-sharing plan monies on behalf of
all employees who went on strike and were subsequently replaced. After noting
that there was a single comprehensive employee profit-sharing plan in which
each employee participated75 the court focused on such differences between
68. Id.
69. Id. at 703.
70. Id. at 702.

71. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
72. This can be interpreted as a direct rejection of the substantive theory as a basis of
legitimacy for class actions. See text accompanying notes 59-63 supra.
73. See, e.g., Wilson v. First Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs, 254 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1971), overruled, Frankel v. City of Miami Beach, 340 So. 2d 463 (1976). In this case the Third
District Court of Appeal denied a class action by used car dealers in a suit against a bank for
conversion. In denying the class, the court noted that "[t]he interest of each appellant is completely independent of the interest of the other named appellants and is independent of the
other alleged members of the class." Id. at 363.
74. 294 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974), overruled, Frankel v. City of Miami Beach, 340
So. 2d 463 (1976). See also Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Pasco, 275 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1973), overruled, Frankel v. City of Miami Beach, 340 So. 2d 463 (1976), in which the court
stated: "Mhe leading case in Florida concerning the principles for maintaining a class action
in a suit based upon separate contracts is Osceola Groves." Id. at 48.
75. 294 So. 2d at 338.
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employees as age and length of employment. Relying on Osceola Groves
despite the absence of an allegation of fraud, the court concluded that the
requisite community of interest was lacking because the appellant's interest in
the profit-sharing plan was independent of the interest of the other alleged
members of the class. No employee was found to have a pecuniary interest in
any fellow employee's rights under the plan. The claimants did not assert the
presence of a cooperative enterprise . The class members did have a community of interest in the issues to be litigated. Under a broad definition of
community of interest this class would have been allowed however, such an
77
interest could not satisfy the strict joint interest rule of Osceola Groves.
Florida courts readily embraced the restrictive rule announced in Osceola
Groves because of their traditional adherence to the privity concept. 78 That
case's narrow requirement of privity among the class members in the form of a
joint interest in the subject matter of the litigation79 did not require an understanding of the purpose and utility of the class suit for application. Thus, the
courts were allowed to impose an artificial restraint against overextension of
the class device without full analysis5 ° The traditional legal concept of privity,
although vague, was more readily acceptable to courts and litigants than an
innovative legal concept designed to meet the changing needs of society.81
The strict community of interest rule was used extensively in class action
cases for two decades after Osceola Groves.8 2 In Frankel v. City of Miami
Beach,83 the Florida supreme court finally limited Osceola Groves to its facts by
distinguishing that action as one based in fraud. In Frankel, Miami Beach water
consumers concerned with the effective date of an ordinance increasing the
water rate brought a class action suit for a declaratory judgment against the
City of Miami Beach. The Third District Court of Appeal relied on Osceola
Groves case law to affirm the trial court's dismissal of the class allegations.84 The
Florida supreme court reversed 85 and expressly overruled ten district court of
76. Id.
77. See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
78. See text accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
79. 78 So. 2d at 702.
80. The courts' readiness to embrace an overly restrictive test probably stems from the
general lack of appreciation for the theoretical underpinnings of the class action device. See
text accompanying notes 34-63 supra. Classes which are restricted to those members exhibiting
joint interest present comparatively few administrative difficulties. The definitional scope of
the class is readily identifiable. Without proper appreciation of the social utility inherent in
use of the class device, it is to be expected that courts will be reluctant to embrace the complexities which accompany imaginative uses of the class action procedure.
81. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Pasco, 275 So. 2d 46, 48-49 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1973), overruled, Frankel v. City of Miami Beach, 340 So. 2d 463 (1976).
82. The pleading requirements for class actions of Port Royal v. Conboy, 154 So. 2d 734,
736-37 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1963), that "there must be a common right of recovery based on the
same essential facts," id. at 737, were adopted by the Florida supreme court in Harrell v. Hess
Oil & Chem. Corp., 287 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1973) but were virtually ignored by the courts in favor
of Osceola Groves, despite Port Royal's differentiation of the two applications. Id. at 737-38.
83. 240 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1976).
84. 296 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974), rev'd, Frankel v. City of Miami Beach, 340 So. 2d
463 (Fla. 1976).
85. 340 So. 2d 463, 470 (Fla. 1976).
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appeal cases8s for misapplying the Osceola Groves rule to cases which did not
contain allegations of fraud. The court restated its holding in Osceola Groves
to clarify that opinion:
,][Me held that in order to institute or defend a class action wherein
aud is alleged the members of the class must: 1) be engaged in a cooperative enterprise; 2) have a joint pecuniary interest; and 3) not have
a choice of remedies which may be subject to separate and distinct defenses.87
Although the Frankel court struck a heavy blow to the application of the
joint interest test in cases which do not involve fraud, the court refused a subsequent opportunity to officially terminate the doctrine's restrictive influence
over fraud-related class actions. In Avila South Condominum Association, Inc.
v. Kappa Corp.,ss a concurring opinion noted the possibility of eliminating the
joint interest requirement in certain fraud cases.8 9 The majority opinion, however, applied the Osceola Groves fraud rule without comment. The Avila South
opinion completely ignored the Frankel observation that the trend in other
jurisdictions since Osceola Groves has been away from the joint interest requirement in nonfraud and fraud cases. 90
Although the Florida supreme court in Frankel limited the Osceola Groves
rule to cases involving allegations of fraud, the joint interest test is overly restrictive, even in cases involving fraud. Osceola Groves eliminates fraud cases
from class action treatment without the support of an analytical distinction
based on the substantive policies against fraud. Furthermore, the Osceola
86. Jackson v. Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc., 301 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974); Randall
v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 296 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974); Sams v.
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 294 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974); Watnick v. Florida Commercial
Banks, Inc., 275 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973); Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Pasco, 275
So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973); Daniels v. National Brands Tire Co., 270 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1972); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Bader, 266 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1972); John E.
Withers Transfer & Storage Co. v. Overstreet, 254 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1971); Wilson v.
First Nat'l Bank of Miami Springs, 254 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1971); Metropolitan Dade
County v. Maddox, 242 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1971).
87. 340 So. 2d at 468.
88. 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977).

89. Justice England, in a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, indicated his willingness to partially abandon the fraud rule:
The time has come, I believe, to acknowledge the possibility that condominium developers
in Florida may have spawned a new form of fraud- class fraud by general, public misrepresentations - and to admit that historic rules governing access to the courts are inappropriate to remedy this unique and pervasive problem. I would at least shift the
burden of proving up the class by allowing the action and then, if it should develop as a
matter of proof by the developers that individual unit owners were not in fact misled by
the asserted representations or did not in fact rely on them, the unit owners in that
category should simply be dismissed from the class.
Id. at 610 (England, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
90. 340 So. 2d at 465. The 1930 federal case on which the Florida supreme court relied in
formulating the Osceola Groves rule was decided when federal rule 38 was the guideline for
federal class actions. During this period the federal courts were also mired in the community
of interest theory. See text accompanying notes 49-53 supra.
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Groves rule fails to consider whether fairness and judicial economy would
seem to justify the use of the class action device. Indeed, no rational explanation of the fraud distinction has been offered, 91 and the doctrine's overly restrictive effects should be recognized as inapplicable to both fraud and nonfraud cases. Fairness and judicial economy should be determinative of all cases
in which the parties are too numerous to make joinder practicable.
PUBLIC ENTITY CLASS AaTIONS: SEEDS OF REFORM

Even before the Osceola Groves decision, some Florida courts9 2 had expressed a desire to broaden the definition of community of interest beyond the
joint interest test and thereby expand the potential application of the class
action device. Courts which espoused this liberal expansion would have restricted its application to public entity litigation. It was appropriate, therefore,
that the Florida supreme court finally limited the scope of Osceola Groves in
the public entity decision of Frankel v. City of Miami Beach.93
In cases involving public entities, the actions or regulations challenged
usually create legislative or administrative classes by the very terms of such
enactments. Litigation by one member of such a predetermined class necessarily
affects the interests of all other class members. When this situation leads to an
inequitable result, Florida courts have been willing to allow mere commonality
of issues to satisfy the broad community of interest test.
In City of Miami Beach v. Tenney94 and Tenney v. City of Miami Beach,95
early cases involving the City of Miami Beach's special assessment liens for road
construction, the court allowed a class action against the city which resulted in
91. The Florida supreme court in Frankel gave some indication that it was not completely enamored with the continued viability of the fraud rule. After noting that the Osceola
Groves rule derived from federal practice, the court stated:
Subsequent to our adoption of the Federal rule in Osceola Groves, however, the Federal
Courts receded from that view.., and adopted the exact opposite view. Since the complaint
in the instant case does not allege fraud, we have no occasion to consider the desirability of
continued adherence to the fraud class action rule adopted in Osceola Groves, supra.
[citations omitted]. 340 So. 2d at 468.
The next opportunity the court had to consider the fraud rule was in Avila South. See text
accompanying note 89 supra.
92. The court in Tenney v. City of Miami Beach, 152 Fla. 126, 11 So. 2d 188 (1942) used
language which, if given its broadest meaning, could have served as a basis for liberal application of the community of interest theory:
The very purpose of a class suit is to save a multiplicity of suits, to reduce the expense
of litigation, to make legal processes more effective and expeditious, and to make available
a remedy that would not otherwise exist ....
...A class suit is brought on the theory that claims, issues and defenses are common
and that when the right of nominal parties to the suit is adjudicated, the right as to all
becomes in effect adjudicated.
Id. at 129, 11 So. 2d at 189-90.
93. 340 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1976). See text accompanying notes 82-87 supra.
94. 150 Fla. 241, 7 So. 2d 136 (1942).
95. 152 Fla. 126, 11 So. 2d 188 (1942).
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the cancellation of those liens. The Tenney court expressly acknowledged the
development of a more liberal interpretation of the community of interest test
and noted that class actions were proper even "where the individual claimants
were completely separate and distinct and the only community of interest
among them was in the question at issue, and perhaps in the kind of relief.""6
The Florida supreme court also recognized that the class action device enables
settlement of an entire controversy with a single decree and simultaneous determination of separate rights and obligations of each individual claimant 7
The Tenney dicta which permitted class suits which challenge governmental
actions spawned a series of cases ranging from a 1959 class action challenging
the authority of the City of Miami to levy traffic fines9s to a 1977 action in
which nonresident water subscribers challenged the rate structure imposed by
the City of Cocoa. 99
The advantages afforded litigants in class actions involving public entities
were not extended to purely private suits. This difference in the treatment of
putative classes moved one Florida court to attempt to create a "public entities"
rule for class actions. 00 The distinction was so well received that the Third
District Court of Appeal noted that "a pattern is emerging wherein the courts
are more predisposed to allow class actions where public entities through the
exercise of governmental authority have become involved as opposed to those
actions where exclusively private interests are involved." 1°o While Florida
courts held an allegiance to the community of interest theory,20 2 those same
courts realized that the concept could cause inequity.
The dichotomy between public and private entity class action litigation
exemplifies the confused state of the law and has been developed by the
Supreme Court of Florida for at least two reasons. On the one hand, the court
has weighed heavily the spectre of numerous suits. In City of Miami v. Keton:03
the purported class was comprised of two subclasses of 190,000 and 50,000
persons, determined according to the method by which the individuals submitted to the imposition of a challenged traffic fine. The court noted that the
class action served to aggregate approximately a quarter of a million cases.
Requiring each claimant to institute a separate action to recover his claim
would impose a useless and insufferable burden on the courts, the city and the
taxpayers.104 However, litigation by one class member of the city's authority to
impose traffic fines would effectively resolve that issue for the entire class.
96. 150 Fla. at 246, 7 So. 2d at 141 (citing Wiggins v. Scott, 112 Ky. 252, 254, 65 S.W. 596,

598 (1901).
97. Id.

98. City of Miami v. Keton, 115 So. 2d 547 (1959).
99. Mohme v. City of Cocoa, 356 So. 2d 2 (Fla.4th D.C.A. 1977).
100. Watnick v. Florida Commercial Banks, Inc., 275 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973),
overruled, Frankel v. City of Miami Beach, 340 So. 2d 463 (1976) (misapplied the rule announced in Osceola Groves in denying class status to a group of credit card holders suing for
usury).
101. Id. at 280.
102. See notes 64-91 supra and accompanying text.
103. 115 So. 2d 547 (Fla.1959).
104. Id. at 552.
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Therefore, a class developed to prevent disregard of the interests of the more
peripheral class members.
The class by necessity doctrine traditionally allows class treatment only
when ordinary bipolar litigation would decide the issue for those nonparties
who would otherwise comprise the class.' 05 However, the doctrine was never
intended to encompass nor thereby to legitimize any and all class actions in
which the class members share only common issues. Florida courts have continually refused to extend the class by necessity doctrine and other remedial
devices to groups which bear weaker membership ties than that created by the
actions of public entities.1 06
A second possible reason for the dichotomy between public and private
entity class action litigation is recognition of a community of interest in public
entity cases among the class members. Generally, the government action being
challenged is viewed as a unitary act which simultaneously affects the entire
class of people toward whom it is directed. Thus, by the very terms of its
creation, the public - private entity dichotomy assumes the public entity litigation to be more closely knit than a purported class in purely private litigation.
Regardless of the justification, public entity litigation has served as the
vehicle by which Florida decisions have consistently attempted to eliminate the
restrictive joint interest test. As long as the community of interest theory remains the major theoretical underpinning for use of the class device, relaxation
of the joint interest test will afford only partial relief from the artificial limitations mandated by adherence to this rigid theory. Even where a class action is
allowed, the court's analysis is dominated by the search for the requisite community of interest instead of developing the factors which should properly be
considered in determining whether a case is appropriate for class treatment.
The debilitating effect of reliance on even an expanded community of interest
theory is well illustrated in two recent Florida decisions.
In Cordell v. World Insurance Co., 0 7 the First District Court of Appeal was
faced with a purported class action for declaratory relief on behalf of the insurance policyholders whose policies had been cancelled under identical provisions in their insurance contracts. The analysis of the propriety of the class
action should have focused on the commonality of the issues to be litigated.
The opinion, however, focused on the relationship between the putative class
members. In reversing the trial court's dismissal of the class action, the court
reasoned that because the several insureds' rights of renewal were dependent
upon the renewal of the other policies in the same series, the rights of the
policyholders were sufficiently intertwined to warrant class treatment. 08 This
convoluted reasoning was necessary only because the court felt compelled to
honor a tradition in Florida jurisprudence by showing fealty to the community
of interest theory. It was the predominance of common issues to be litigated,

105. See note 53 supra and text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
106. E.g., Watnick v. Florida Commercial Banks, Inc., 275 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973),
overruled, Frankel v. City of Miami Beach, 340 So. 2d 463 (1976).
107. 355 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978).
108. Id. at 481.
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rather than the specious interrelationship between the policyholders, which
made the Cordell case a prime candidate for class treatment.
In Smith v. Atlantic Boat Builder Co.,10 9 the same court allowed a class

action by 100 employees seeking enforcement of a lien for back wages. While
the commonality of the issues raised by each employee's independent but
factually similar lien should have been sufficient to satisfy the broad community
of interest test, the court chose to forsake that analysis altogether. Rather, the
court contented itself with relying on a "common right of recovery" 110 as the
basis for class formation. While superficial analysis of the Smith decision might

suggest that use of the "common right of recovery" rationale serves to deprive
the community of interest theory of what little influence remained after the
public entity exceptions, this was not the intended import of the opinion.
Furthermore, it is not likely that a lower court opinion could substantially
dislodge the deeply embedded community of interest doctrine.

Harrell v. Hess Oil &Chemical Corp.: A FunctionalAnalysis
If the courts and litigants of Florida were willing to limit the application
of the class action device to cases which satisfy the joint interest test of the
community of interest theory, the blending of substantive and procedural law
would not be difficult. Class actions would only be proper when the requisite
privity existed. Under this approach most attempted uses of the class device
would be rejected, as the reign of Osceola Groves indicates.1"l In those limited
cases in which the class device would be permitted, the administrative pro109. 856 So. 2d 359 (Fla. lst D.C.A. 1978).
110. Id. at 362.
111. The full impact of the 21-year reign of Osceola Groves is apparent from the supreme
court's review of the Florida class action cases in Frankel v. City of Miami Beach, 340 So. 2d
463 (Fla. 1976). In reducing Osceola Groves to a holding applicable only in fraud cases, the
supreme court reinstated the seven class action pleading requirements of Harrell v. Hess Oil &
Chem. Corp., 287 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1973) as the true test for nonfraud class action cases. See text
accompanying notes 114-177 infra. In reviewing the past application of these requirements, the
court stated:
These seven requirements have been held to have been met as to plaintiff classes in
numerous cases, e.g., City of Miami v. Keton, 115 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1959); State ex rel. Bailey
v. Gomez, 152 Fla. 355, 11 So. 2d 569 (1943); Tenney v. City of Miami Beach, 152 Fla. 126,
11 So. 2d 188 (1942); City of Miami Beach v. Tenney, 150 Fla. 241, 7 So. 2d 136 (1942);
Town of Davenport v. Hughes, 147 Fla. 228, 2 So. 2d 851 (1941); State Road Department v.
Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So. 2d 298 (1941); Knowles v. Central Allapattae Properties, 145 Fla.
123, 198 So. 819 (1940); Dunscombe v. Smith, 139 Fla. 497, 190 So. 796 (1939); Allen v.
Avondale Co. 135 Fla. 6, 185 So. 137 (1938); Olds v. Alvord, 133 Fla. 345, 183 So. 711 (1938);
Meier v. Johnston, 110 Fla. 374, 149 So. 185 (193); Pinellas County v. Town of Belleair
Shore, 180 So. 2d 510 (Fla. App. 2d 1965); and Port Royal Inc. v. Conboy, 154 So. 2d 734
(Fla. App. 2d 1965). Similarly, these requirements have been held to be satisfied as to a
single plaintiff suing the members of unincorporated associations as defendant classes in
Ross v. Gerung, 69 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1954) and State ex rel. Vile v. Shaw, 52 So. 2d 676 (Fla.
1951) ....

840 So. 2d at 465. Of the 15 cases cited by the Frankelcourt which had certified classes applying
the requirements set forth in Harrell,13 were decided before Osceola Groves,
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cedures would not differ markedly from those used in the average two-party
law suit. Only when class actions are expanded to include cases justifiable under
the more liberal community of interest, consent or substantive theories does
consolidation of the procedures present difficulties. Regardless of such increased
complexity, however, the conditions of modern society mandate broader use
of the class action device. More extensive use of that device in Florida is barred
in some nonfraud cases only by the bare remnants of the joint interest test.
Unfortunately, the Florida supreme court has failed to offer sufficient leadership in developing a judicially feasible class action rule. Although Osceola
Groves held that fraud cases require a showing of joint interest, 112 the court
waited until Frankel,112 twenty-six years later, to clarify that nonfraud cases do
not require the same showing. In the interim, however, the court decided
Harrell v. Hess Oil & Chemical Corp.11 4 This case involved a purported class
action by owners of land with riparian rights for damages caused by the discharge of sand and silt into a creek. Although the court held that the complaint
failed to properly plead a class action, the court's opinion analyzed in depth the
use of the class action device in Florida. The Harrell court attempted to provide meaningful guidelines with which to judge the propriety of a class action
by announcing seven class action pleading requirements:
1) show the necessity for bringing the action as a class suit;
2) show plaintiff's right to represent the class;
3) allege that plaintiff brought suit on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated;
4) allege the existence of a class, described with some degree of certainty;
5) allege that the members of the class were so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court;
6) make it clear that plaintiff adequately represents the class; and
7) show that the interests of the plaintiff were co-extensive with the interests of the other members of the class. "1 5
Just as a lack of in-depth analysis pervades all areas of class action law in
Florida, the decision in Harrell failed to explain in detail the seven requirements for pleading a class action. Upon examination, those requirements do
not provide a viable class action tool in the black-letter form presented.
Analysis of each of the seven Harrell elements must begin with an understanding of the function each is intended to perform. This functional approach
allows the use of federal precedent to develop the practical import of the
Harrell requirements, despite admitted variances in nomenclature and theoretical basis between Florida and federal precedent. While the Harrell requirements are based upon the community of interest theory, the requirements of
the federal rule are founded on the community of interest, consent and substantive theories of class actions.110 Thus, the use of federal precedent in
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See text accompanying notes 66-73 supra.
See text accompanying notes 83-87 supra.
287 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1973).
Id. at 293-94.
The drafters of the 1966 version of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
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interpreting Harrell must be justified because it necessarily broadens the intended scope of the Harrellrequirements.
The first such justification is the common derivation of the federal and
Florida rules which has resulted in Florida courts relying on federal rule re-

quirements on an ad hoc basis.117 Secondly, several of the Florida community of
interest cases can be justified on the consent or substantive theories. 1 8 In
Frankel,for example, the Florida supreme court emphasized that some Florida
cases have allowed class actions to be maintained "even though the rights of
each [class member] were separate." 1" 9 Ignoring the analytical distortions made
in searching for a community of interest, several Florida decisions have allowed
classes which are actually "common question" classes1 20 The common question
attempted to define the situations in which the use of the class device was proper. Rule 23(b)
sets forth these situations:

(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would
create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable
to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action
is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy .,..
FE. R. Crv. P. 23(b).
The situations set forth in 11(1) and 11(2) are consistent with the community of interest
theory. These types of class actions are, like the community of interest classes, concerned with
the necessity of the class action. The failure to use the class device may result in the nonparties to the individual action having rights practically concluded without representation in
the lawsuit.
The situation set forth in 11(5) can cover situations beyond the scope of the most expanded
community of interest theory. The focus in 11(5) is on desirability and convenience rather than
necessity. This paragraph encompasses cases which would achieve economies of time, effort
and expense and promote uniformity of decision without sacrificing procedural fairness.
117. See, e.g., Frankel v. City of Miami Beach, 340 So. 2d 463, 469 (citing Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)); Paradise Shore Apartments, Inc. v. Practical Maintenance
Co., 344 So. 2d 299, 303 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977) (citing FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(4)); Imperial Towers
Condominium v. Brown, 358 So. 2d 1081, 1084 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1976) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. at 186); Paulino v. Hardister, 306 So. 2d 125, 128 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1974) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)).
The Florida supreme court sounded a note of caution in Frankel,although it cited Eisen
with approval: "The remainder of the [United States] Supreme Court's decision [in Eisen]
regards its interpretation of the federal class action rule which, absent constitutional considerations, is inapplicable to our interpretation of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
1.220." 540 So. 2d at 469 n.3.
118. See text accompanying notes 54-63 supra.
119. 540 So. 2d at 465.
120. See, e.g., Smith v. Atlantic Boat Builder Co., 356 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978).
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class has most often found its legitimacy in the consent or substantive theories.121

In light of federal precedent, therefore, Harrell's requirements can be
profitably analyzed. While the requirements overlap, they can be broken down
into more manageable groupings. Requirements 2, 3, and 6 of the Harrell decision relate to the typicality and adequacy of the named plaintiff's representation; requirements 4 and 5 relate to the existence and maneuverability of the
class as a unit, and requirements 1 and 7 relate to the requisite interrelationship
between the plaintiff and his class.122
Typicality and Adequacy of Representation
The Harrell court required the individual plaintiffs to show their right to
represent the class and to allege that the suit was brought on behalf of the
plaintiff and all others similarly situated.1 2 3 Neither Harrell nor its progeny
offers an explanation of what the court intended by these requirements. Functionally, Harrell's requirements 2 and 3 appear to relate to the federal rule
requirement that the claims of the representative party be typical of the claims
of the class.124 Typicality has been judically defined in Amswiss International
Corp. v. Heublein Insurance,1 25 wherein the court held that the typicality requirement would not be satisfied if the representative plaintiff did not prove
all the elements of the cause of action which would be presented by the individual class members of the class were they initiating individual actions:
In other words, in the course of proving its own claim plaintiff must also
prove the claims of the other members of the class. The claims and defenses... would not be typical if it would require substantially more or
less proof than required for the other members of the class.1 26
Typicality and another federal rule requirement of adequacy of representa121. See note 61 supra.
122. The Frankel fraud requirement, although applicable only to fraud cases, is properly
considered as part of requirement 7 of the Harrell test. See text accompanying notes 87 & 115
supra.
123. The requirements of Harrell assume that a plaintiff is seeking to maintain a class on
behalf of a plaintiff class. On occasion plaintiffs seek to maintain an action against a defendant
class. The Florida courts have uniformly sought to find a strong community of interest before
allowing the maintenance of a defendant class. E.g., City of Lakeland v. Chase Nat'l Co., 32
So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1947). The courts have noted that there are distinctions between plaintiff and
defendant classes which justify more caution in allowing and administering the latter. In
Paulino v. Hardister, 806 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974), the court noted that it made the
distinction between a plaintiff's class and a defendant's class "advisedly because, generally
speaking, where a plaintiff sues on behalf of a class, the relief sought is likely to be favorable
to the rest of the class; whereas, the opposite is usually true where the suit is brought against
the class." Id. at 129.
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3): "(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members
of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if . . . (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class ...."
125. 69 F.R.D. 6563 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
126. Id. at 667. See Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 58 F.R.D. 436, 442-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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tion are interrelated and often considered as coextensive.1 27 The court in
Harrell required that the plaintiff dearly show it adequately represented the
class. This is substantially the same as the federal requirement that the representative must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.' 28 The
requirement is constitutionally mandated to ensure due process to the absent
129

class members.
Discussion by Florida courts of the adequacy requirement has spawned
varying standards. In Ross v. Gerung,30 the Florida supreme court emphasized
that finding the necessary community of interest was determinative and announced that the test for presence of community of interest is whether the class
members could better protect their interests by representing themselves.' 1 The
court emphasized that a mere numbers game which compared the number
seeking to maintain the action with the number to be represented was not a
determinative factor. 32 While Ross does not materially advance the analysis
beyond the original language, other courts have attempted to use different
words to interpret the meaning of adequate representation. One court apparently denied class status because the representative did not "represent a
cross-section of the interests involved."'' 33 Another court opted for an even more
subjective test, noting that "the case was very ably argued, orally and by
brief, 13 4 thereby satisfying the requirement that "the representation [be] fair
and adequate." 135 Other Florida courts have emphasized that the interests of
the representatives and the class members must be "coextensive,"1 36 but have
127. Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co., 68 F.R.D. 443, 452 (M.D. Ga. 1975).
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4): "(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of
a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if... (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class .... "
129. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940). The requirements of Hansberyy are discussed in text accompanying notes 190-194 infra.
120. 69 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1954).
131. Id. at 651.
132. Id. In Ross, three members of a church society were seeking to represent the entire
membership of 900.
133. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Wilson, 305 So. 2d 202, 305 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974).
Wilson is an example of the lack of analysis of the relevant issues and of the substitution of
extraneous materials, as evidenced in the following quotation:
The second readily apparent fault in the court's determination that this action is a proper
class suit appears in the finding that these appellees meet the prerequisites for the representation of the claimed class. Federated Dept. Stores v. Pasco, Fla. App. 1973, 275 So.
2d 46. The diverse business losses and inconveniences involved in a 24 hour stoppage of
telephone service must be considered in light of the fact that a public utility receives a
regulated profit. All increases in costs are directly passed on to the customer by the regulation of rates. The appellees do not allege that they represent a cross-section of the interests
involved. It appears that they are two of a very large number of possibly interested parties.
Id. at 305.
134. Town of Davenport v. Hughes, 147 Fla. 228, 231, 2 So. 2d 851, 854 (1941).
135. Id. at 231, 2 So. 2d at 854.
136. E.g., Sams v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 294 So. 2d 337, 338 (Fla. 3d D.CA. 1974),
overruled, Frankel v. City of Miami Beach, 340 So. 2d 463 (1976). This case was overruled in
Frankel for misapplying the .Osceola Groves rule. See notes 86 supra and accompanying text.
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interpreted this to require practically identical interests on all litigated facts,
1 7
including damages. 3
Neither rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor its predecessor
specifically enumerated the factors which are relevant to determining adequacy
of representation. 3 8 Federal courts have considered various factors in interpreting the requirement. They have required the class proponent to be a member
of the class 139 or to have an interest which is coextensive rather than adverse to

those of the class.140 However, total agreement with the class has not been required. 14 1 In Hettinger v. Glass Specialty Co.,142 a federal district court based
the determination of adequacy on whether the interests of the representative
parties are coextensive with the interests of the class and whether the representa43
tive parties and their attorneys can be expected to prosecute the action.'
There are other factors which have been considered relevant to the adequacy
requirement by the federal courts. Financial adequacy has been considered a
requirement by some courts. 4 4 This includes the financial ability to pay for
individualized notice 45 and to pursue the litigation to completion without additional financial contributions from class members. 1 4 The qualifications, exThe opinion, though obviously tainted, is still useful as an illustration of the lack of a cohesive analysis of the adequacy requirement by a Florida court.
137. E.g., Jackson v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., 301 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974),
overruled, 340 So. 2d 463 (1976). The basis of the cause of action brought as a class action
was the propriety of salary deductions for workers' compensation insurance. Without attempting to analyze the significance of the plaintiff's voluntary termination of employment in
relation to his representation of a class of employees, the court dismissed the class action. Id.
at 796. The court apparently required complete identity of factual issues, since there is no
indication that the plaintiff's voluntary termination in any way affected his ability or desire
to represent the class members seeking reimbursement for previous salary deductions for
workers' compensation insurance.
See also Sams v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 294 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974), overruled,
340 So. 2d 463 (1976). This case involved a class suit by former employees who had been
permanently replaced during a strike for monies allegedly due from a pension plan. Despite
focusing on the independent interest of the class representative as a basis of denial of class
treatment, the court's opinion emphasized differences in age, length of employment, contribution to plan, election and mode of payment as the basis for denial of class status. Id. at 338.
These facts were probative of the amount the class members would have been entitled to if
they had prevailed on the issue of whether employees terminated because of a strike had an
interest in the pension plan.
138. Knowles v. War Damage Corp., 171 F.2d 15, 18 (D.C. Civ. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 914 (1949). See notes 17 & 30 supraand accompanying text.
139. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 30, 43 (1940).
140. Id. at 41
141. Remond v. Commerce Trust Co., 144 F.2d 140, 151-52 (8th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 776 (1945).
142. 59 F.R.D. 286 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
143. Id. at 296.
144. E.g., Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
145. The Florida supreme court in Frankel held that individualized notice must be provided to those class members who can be identified through reasonable effort. See text accompanying notes 186-208 infra.
146. In Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973), the federal
district court held that to fairly and adequately represent the interests, the named plaintiffs
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perience and ability of the class representative's lawyer to conduct the litigation
is another important factor in consideration of the adequacy of representation. 147 These factors are all directed to the court's concern that the class
representative "put up a real fight."148
Certainty and Numerosity of the Class Unit
The Florida supreme court required the plaintiffs in Harrell to allege the
existence of a class and to describe that class with some degree of certainty. The
plaintiffs were also required to allege the members of the class were so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court. 49
These requirements are functionally analogous to the federal rule requirement
that the class be so numerous as to make the joinder of all its members impracticable.1 50 The certainty and numerosity requirements are interrelated insofar as the class must be defined with enough certainty to allow the court to
determine if joinder is impracticable. The Florida supreme court, without
setting any specific guideposts to the numerosity requirement, noted that "impracticable" is not to be treated as synonymous with "inconvenient."'1' There
is a split of authority among the Florida courts of appeal as to whether the
court can take judicial notice of the numerosity of the purported class. Two
courts have held that the number of persons constituting the class must be
alleged unless the members are so numerous that the court can take judicial
notice.1 5 2 Conversely, one court has held that the number of persons constituting the class must always be affirmatively established.1b3
Juxtapositionof Plaintiffand Class
The Harrell case requires that the plaintiff show a necessity for bringing
the action as a class suit. 54 Functionally, this is equivalent to the federal rule
requirement that the class action device be "superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."' 55 However,
"must sustain the burden of showing that their resources are adequate to pursue this lawsuit
to completion, even in the absence of any additional financial contributions from members of
the purported class:' Id. at 433.
147. Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472,496-97 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
148. Id. at 494.
149. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
150. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(1) (a prerequisite to a class action is that "the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable"). There is a dearth of meaningful
federal precedent concerning this requirement.
151. City of Lakeland v. Chase Nat'l Co., 159 Fla. 783, 790-91, 32 So. 2d 833, 838 (Ea.
1947). But ef., Advertising Specialty Nat'l Ass'n v. ITC, 238 F.2d 108, 119 (1st Cir. 1956)
(" '[i]mpracticability' does not mean 'impossibility' but only the difficulty or inconvenience of
joining all members of the class').
152. Hendler v. Rodgers House Condominium, Inc., 234 So. 2d 128, 130 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1970); Port Royal v. Conboy, 154 So. 2d 734, 737 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1963).
153. Brown v. Ellingson, 224 So. 2d 391, 395 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969), appeal dismissed without opinion, 237 So. 2d 767 (1970).
154. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
155. F n. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). This requirement is applicable only to "common question"
classes under the federal rule. See note 116 supra.
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neither Harrellnor its progeny attempted to analyze the necessity requirement.
One Florida appelate court 156 apparently felt that necessity meant that the class
device must be shown to be the best available procedure before its use could be
justified. 157 In rejecting the proffered use, the court reasoned that such use
"would produce the type of complexity which renders a class action the least
rather than the most expeditious method of handling the claims of the various
58
property owners involved.'
Federal courts, 5 9 on the other hand, have defined the meaning of the
analogous rule 23 requirement of "superiority."16 0 The major limitation to
using the federal definition for guidance in Florida cases is that the Florida
requirement of "necessity" could be applied to any class action sought to be
maintained in Florida, while the federal requirement of superiority is relevant
only to loosely tied "common question" classes.' 61 To apply the analogous
federal requirement to the more rigid joint interest class actions would be a
superfluous exericse, because the requirement of superiority was intended to aid
in making the inevitable value judgments inherent in common question class
actions. While this seems to suggest that the Harrell requirements were intended to cover only the narrow community of interest classes which have
dominated the Florida decisions, there is no valid reason why the language of
Florida rule 1.220 and the requirements of Harrell should not be judicially
construed to include "common question" classes. Therefore, the use of federal
precedent is not only proper but also advisable.
In Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co., 162 a federal court interpreted the requirement of superiority to mandate that a plaintiff must demonstrate that a
class action is the best means of resolving the controversy. 63 The factor of
manageability of the case as a class action is of major importance in considering superiority of the class device. 64 The requirement is so basic as to be
inherent in any consideration of the propriety of maintaining a class action. If
the case is unmanageable as a class action, the class proponent will be unable to
show the necessity for bringing the action as a class suit as required by Harrell.165 Unlike some legal requirements which work hardship on only the
losing party if improperly applied by the court, the requirement of man156. Costin v. Hargraves, 283 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1973).
157. The optional methods to which class adjudication is compared include joinder,
intervention, consolidation, a test case and administrative procedures. E.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
158. 283 So. 2d at 377.
159. E.g,, Plekowski v. Ralston Purina Co., 68 F.R.D. 443 (M.D. Ga. 1975).
160. Fm. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). See note 116 supra.
161. See note 61 supra.
162. 68 F.R.D. 443 (M.D. Ga. 1975).
163. Id. at 454. The court continued: "Thus, if as here the maintenance of a case as a
class action presents problems not present in some other procedural alternative it clearly is
not superior to all other methods." Id. This definition is admittedly couched in conservative
terms. It was selected for balance in analysis since the use of the "superiority" standard implicitly expands the class action device beyond its traditionally accepted use in Florida.
164. The requirement of manageability is analytically intertwined with the requirement
that the issues common to the class predominate over individual issues.
165. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
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ageability is present as much for the protection of the court as for fairness to
the litigants.166 The key to this judicial consideration of manageability is
whether it is logistically feasible to litigate all claims of all members of the
putative class. Satisfaction of this requirement is replete with the practical considerations which determine the feasibility of the class device in any given case.
Coextensiveness
The Harrell court also required the plaintiff to show that the interests of
the plaintiff are coextensive with the interest of the other members of the
class. 16' The Florida courts have consistently used this requirement as the prime
analytical foundation for the community of interest limitation. 6 A fair reading
of the requirement, however, does not mandate this limitation169 The plain
language of the requirement can be legitimately interpreted to permit the
formation of common question classes by analogizing to the federal requirement that there be common questions of law or fact which predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members of the class." 0 The juxtaposition of the requirements of coextensiveness 'and predominance serves the
pragmatic purpose of giving substance to the otherwise overinclusive language
which requires more than merely commonality of issues. Conversely, to read the
coextensive requirement literally would require an identity among class members not considered necessary for the proper application of the class device.
Since the function of both coextensiveness and predominance is to ensure the
manageability of a class action, they are properly analogous.
The federal rule allows the courts to evaluate the predominance of common
questions only after examining the propriety of the class action under the requirements relating to that status of the representative plaintiff"' and separate
requirements relating to the existence and maneuverability of the purported
class. 72 In analyzing the predominance requirement, a federal court in Transit
Co. Tire Antitrust Litigation"T7 opined:
It is only where this predominance exists that economy can be achieved
by means of the class action device. And, if there is present a likelihood
that significant questions not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability will arise affecting only individual members of the
Furclass in different ways, class action treatment is inappropriate ....
thermore if it appears that the class action would in practicality degenerate into multiple lawsuits, class action proceeding is inappropriate."-

166. E.g., Eisen cases cited in note 41 supra. The troubled history of Eisen is indicative of
the difficulties which can befall a court which improvidently certifies a class.
167. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
168. See text accompanying notes 64-91 supra.
169. See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
170. FEn. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3). See note 116 supra.
171. See text accompanying notes 123-148 supra.
172. See text accompanying notes 149-153 supra.
173. 67 F.R.D. 59 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
174. Id. at 75.
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Analysis of the predominance requirement, therefore, requires an initial evaluation of the issues presented to determine which questions are properly
susceptible to common proof. Courts have held common issues predominant
notwithstanding individual issues concerning reliance, deception and damages. 175 There is no clear guidance as to what will give rise to this predominance, although several interpretations are possible.17 6 Predominance can be
determined by comparing the number of common issues with the number of
individual issues, the difficulty of proof related to the common issues with that
related to the individual issues, and the amount of time required to litigate the
common issues with the time required to litigate the individual issues.77
Alternatively, the court may consider in a noncomparative fashion whether
the litigation of the individual issues would take substantial trial time. The
choice of the standard to be applied depends essentially upon the court's
philosophy toward class actions. The noncomparative alternative is clearly the
most restrictive of the four possible interpretations, and its adoption would
prevent class actions from being used to their fullest potential.
PRETRIAL PROCEDURES

Despite the expansive effect of the functional analysis on the Harrell requirements, there are certain pretrial procedures not discernible from Harrell's
requirements 17s which must be considered. Florida decisions have provided
little guidance on administrative considerations, as distinguished from the
requirements which determine when a class action is proper. There is no overall
analytical justification for relying on federal decisions since pretrial procedures
are exclusively administrative in nature. The single exception is in the area of
notice, and Florida courts have relied on the federal precedent in formulating
notice requirements. Thus, references in this section to the federal requirements
other than notice are offered to provide perspective rather than analytical support.
Certification
Rule 1.220 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and Florida case law
do not provide for formal certification of the class. Because the requirements
of Harrellare couched in terms of pleadings, the procedural steps to be taken
by a plaintiff who successfully avoids a motion to strike remain obscure279 The
175. E.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969).
176. Analysis by a court considering the predominance factor generally fails to enunciate
a definition of predominance, perhaps preferring to define it subjectively. The only objective
manifestation of the court's decision usually is sterile language concerning multiplicity of law
suits. E.g., Transit Co. Tire Antitrust Litigation, 67 F.R.D. 59, 75 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
177. Landers, supra note 5, at 861.
178. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
179. The Harrell court indicated that a motion to dismiss class allegations is not proper.
Rather, the "more appropriate motion would have been one to strike the portions of the
complaint relating to a class action." 287 So. 2d at 294. In Frankel, the court referred to a
motion to dismiss the class action without comment as to its procedural appropriateness. 340
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only rule which can be drawn from examination of the Florida cases is that the
court should make the determination as to the propriety of class treatment as
early as possible.180
The concept of class certification is a federal requirement "to give clear
definition to the action."18, Rule 23(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates that "[a]s soon as practicable after commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it
is to be maintained."1s2 The purpose of certification is to prevent intervention
into the action by class members after the judgment has been rendered1Sn
Focusing on avoiding this "one-way intervention," the federal courts have held
that certification of a common question class action must be made prior to the
8
determination of dispositive motions on the cause of action.1
4 When the concepts of collateral estoppel and res judicata are considered, the concern over
"one-way intervention" appears unfounded. In fact, the lack of a formal certification requirement has had no detrimental effects in Florida.85
Notice

The Florida courts have considered the generally accepted requirement that
the class members must receive notice of the pendency of the class action. In
Frankel v. City of Miami Beach,15 6 the Florida supreme court relied on Eisen
v. Carlisle & JacquelinB7 for the proposition that procedural due process requires individual notice to be provided to those class members who are
identifiable through reasonable effort.188
Two problems arise with the Frankel court's holding on the issue of notice.
First, in Eisen, the United States Supreme Court looked to federal rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and not to the due process, in requiring
that individualized notice be given.18 9 Contrary to Frankel, notice is not a conSo. 2d at 469. Nevertheless, the better rule appears to be that if the attack is upon the
prospective class treatment, the proper motion is a motion to strike.
180. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Pasco, 275 So. 2d 46, 49 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973), overruled, Frankel v. City of Miami Beach, 340 So. 2d 463, 469 (1976).
181. Advisory Committee Note, 39 F.R.D. 104 (1966).
182. Pm. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(1). The rule continues: "An order under this subdivision may be
conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits."
183. FEo. R. Crv. P. 23 as originally adopted in 1938 did not provide for class certification.
Common question classes or "spurious" classes were intended to act as a liberal joinder rule
allowing intervention by class members through and after judgment.
184. See Peritz v. Liberty Loan Corp., 523 F.2d 349, 353 (7th Cir. 1975). But see Sprogis
v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201-02 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
185. The court in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub
nom., Matthews v. Jimenez, 427 U.S. 912 (1976), realized that under modern theories of res
judicata, it was very unlikely that a class opponent would be able to relitigate the issue
against any subsequent opponent when a summary judgment is decided in favor of the
plaintiffs.
186. 340 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1976).
187. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). See note 41 supra.
188. 340 So. 2d at 469-70.
189. A complete quotation of the language in Eisen reveals that the partial quote of the
same language in Frankel.is misleading. In Eisen, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), the Supreme Court
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stitutional requirement in class action cases. Although there is considerable
comment to the contrary, 190 a closer look at the requirements of procedural due
process and the function of notice reveals this to be a fair statement of the law.
The two principal cases relied upon by the proponents of mandatory notice' 91
as a constitutional requirement are Hansberry v. Lee' 92 and Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.' 93 The Court's inquiry in Hansberry was whether
the class member who sought to collaterally attack a class judgment was fairly
and adequately represented in the class action. Hansberry is often thought to
stand for the general proposition that due process requires only "that members
of a class not present as parties to the litigation... [be] adequately represented
by parties who are present.' 194 Mullane suggests that some form of notice is
constitutionally required to foreclose absentees; 95 however, that case involved
an accounting for assets held in common trust. The function of the notice was
to allow the court to acquire jurisdiction 196 - a function not performed by class
actions.
A second problem with the Frankel treatment of notice is that the notice
requirement of Eisen is directed only to common question classes under rule
23(b)(3). 197 Providing notice to classes maintained under the other sections of
rule 23 is therefore optional. Although Frankel involved a common question
class, the Florida supreme court's opinion failed to consider the differences
between joint interest and common question classes in mandating notice.
Florida courts have previously recognized the need for notice to defendant
classes. In Paulino v. Hardister,198 the Second District Court of Appeal, recognizing the absence of controlling rules of procedure, attempted to promulgate
certain practices which could redress the procedural problems in suits against
defendant classes.' 99 The court stated that in suits involving a class of defendants "the court should determine how notice of the suit may best be given
to the absent members of the class, keeping in mind the practicalities of the
situation."200 This requirement of notice to defendant classes addressed the
coercive nature of the class action when used against defendant classes.201 The
stated: "[T]he express language and intent of Rule 23(cX2) leave no doubt that individual
notice must be provided to those class members who are identifiable through reasonable
effort." Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
190. The Advisory Committee's Note accompanying rule 23 states that the mandatory
notice provision of that rule is "designed to fulfill requirements of due process to which the
class action procedure is of course subject." 39 F.R.D. at 107.
191. The Advisory Committee relied upon these two cases as support for its position. Id.

192. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
193. 339 U.S. 306 (195D1).
194. 311 U.S. at 42-43. See, e.g., Comment, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due
ProcessRequirements in Class Actions Under FederalRule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1217, 1224-31
(1975).
195. 339 U.S. at 318-19.

196. Id. at 313.
197.

417 U.S. at 175.

198. 306 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974).
199.

Id. at 129.

200. Id.
201. Id.
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argument that notice is a constitutionally mandated requirement is more
persuasive when applied to defendant classes.2 0 2 Interestingly, Frankel has required individualized notice to all plaintiff class members who can be identified
through reasonable effort,20 3 while Paulino has made discretionary the decision
as to whether individualized notice or publication should be used for de2 04
fendant classes.
Finally, Florida law requires that the proponent of the class must bear the
cost of notice. 20 5 This is consistent with the federal rule announced in Eisen.2 0 6
Florida courts have not addressed the problem of payment of costs which relate
to preparation of the notice. If the individualized notice mandated by Frankel
is to be given, the names and addresses of the proposed class members must be
obtained. This can be an expensive proposition.2 0 7 In federal cases, absent extenuating circumstances, the costs of identifying the class members and compiling the list of names and addresses must be borne by the class proponent.20 8
Discovery
Another problem in the administration of a class action is the timing, scope
and limitations on discovery. In Florida, these discovery determinations are
within the discretion of the trial court. The Florida supreme court has
admonished the trial courts not to rule on the propriety of the class action until
the class proponent "has had the opportunity to employ sufficient discovery to
ascertain the necessary information that must be plead. ' 209 Florida decisions
offer no other guidance on the timing of discovery. Nor is there any indication
as to whether discovery, if allowed prior to class determination, should be
limited to issues establishing the requirements for a class, or whether the class
opponent should be allowed to take discovery from the class proponent. Un-

202. See text accompanying notes 242-249 infra.
203. 340 So. 2d at 469-70.
204. 306 So. 2d at 129.
205. InPaulino, the court stated that "Etihe cost of notice shall be initially borne by the
party seeking relief against the class as, indeed, it would be on the plaintiffs in any case." Id.
206. The Eisen court held that "[t]he usual rule is that a plaintiff must initially bear the
cost of notice to the class .... Where, as here, the relationship between the parties is truly

adversary, the plaintiff must pay for the cost of notice as part of the ordinary burden of
financing his own suit." 417 U.S. at 179.
207. E.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978) (the cost of compiling
the list of names and addresses of class members was estimated at $16,000).
208. The United States Supreme Court required in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders,
457 U.S. 340 (1978) that the representative plaintiffs must bear the expense of compiling the
list of names and addresses of the class members for the purpose of giving notice. The court
did not foreclose the possibility that the class opponent could be required to bear the expense
of compiling this list, but it cautioned the trial courts that "[a]lthough we do not attempt to
catalogue the instances in which a district court might be justified in placing the expense on
the defendant, we caution that courts must not stray too far from the principle underlying
Eisen IV that the representative plaintiff should bear all costs relating to the sending of notice
because it is he who seeks to maintain the suit as a class action." Id. at 360.
209. Frankel v. City of Miami Beach, 340 So. 2d at 469.
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fortunately, the federal rule is silent with regard to the timing and extent of
1
discovery, and the decisional law is rhetorical and virtually useless.2 0

Opting Out
The issue of whether prospective class members should be allowed to "opt
out" of the class is another question which arises in the consideration of a class
action. This concept is associated with common question classes and has not
been addressed in Florida decisions. In The Florida Bar, In re Rule 1.220(b)
FloridaRules of Civil Procedure (Petition to Modify), 211 the Florida supreme
court noted without citation that "trial judges in a number of instances since
adoption of the rule required notification to the putative class members after
institution of suit to provide an opportunity for non-consenting unit owners to

'opt out' of the suit." 212 Despite this isolated reference, Florida decisions indi-

cate that class participation is not optional. In Costin v. Hargraves213 the court
stated that "class members are made parties to the litigation involuntarily and
will be bound by whatever results may follow, regardless of their separate or
individual desires." 21 4 This language hardly contemplates opting out. The
question of whether to allow class members to opt out, like the procedure of
certification, is directed against one-way intervention and seeks to insulate class
judgments from collateral attack. Class action procedures to ensure finality are
unnecessary in light of the concepts of collateral estoppel, res judicatazis and
stare decisis. 21 6 The application of these concepts is independent of the class
217

action rule.

The opt out procedure, part of the federal rule,'2 18 is an implicit application
of the consent theory. It is an attempt to establish a distinctive test for the use
of the class action device by allowing the class members to determine by their
participation whether a particular case is appropriate for class treatment.
Adequate judicial control aimed at securing fair and adequate representation
for absent class members will satisfy at once the objectives of judgment finality
and class viability.

210. E.g., Warnright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (only class representatives and not class members have to respond to written interrogatories under rule 23).
211. 853 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1977).
212. Id. at 97.
213. 282 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1973).
214. Id. at 377.
215. See note 185 supra.
216. The Florida courts have never directly addressed the issue of the effect of stare
decisis on absent parties; however, the Fifth Circuit in Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States,
379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967), recognized the stare decisis doctrine as a barrier to severability of
claims involving a common issue. 379 F.2d at 829.
217. The res judicata effect can be tested only in a subsequent action. RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS §86, Comment (h) (1956). By definition, both collateral estoppel and stare decisis
can be applied only after the entry of a judgment. None of these concepts have application in
attempting to formulate a class rule.
218. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
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A NEw RULE
The previous discussion has focused on the status of the Florida law of

class actions and has suggested that the analysis presently used in Florida be
expanded to include certain of the federal rule requirements. This article,
however, has not attempted to address the myriad of problems with the federal
rule. 219 If the Florida supreme court chooses to adopt a new class action rule,
it would be well advised not to adopt the language of present rule 28 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, the Harrell requirements,

even with the application of the functional analysis, are inadequate to give the
needed guidance to courts and litigants in Florida for handling the multiplicity
of situations in which the class actiQn device should be used. Review of the
Florida decisions indicates that, despite occasional deviations like Franke22
and other public entity cases, 221 Florida decisions remain constrained in use of
the device by an overly restrictive attitude toward class action cases. This
anachronism is the result of the lingering influence of the community of interest theory as the prime justification for the use of class actions.
Contemporary application of the class action device should focus on two
notions. The primary justification for class actions is society's increased realization of the substantive policies underlying the individual causes of action.222
In addition, the class action serves a heuristic function by allowing the courts to
more explicitly consider the scope and magnitude of the litigation in making
their decisions on the merits of the case. 223 These concepts characterize the
underlying basis for the substantive theory of class actions.
Florida courts have never relied on the substantive theory as a justification
for the maintenance of a class action, preferring instead to cling to the more
orthodox community of interest theory.2 24 The most liberal interpretation of
the community of interest theory, however, has been held broad enough to
encompass common question classes - the type of class most commonly associated with the substantive theory.225 Occasional adoption by Florida courts of
the liberalized community of interest standard226 gives hope that those courts
need only the impetus of a new class action rule in order to embrace the more
readily justifiable uses for the class action device. The rule proposed in this
article attempts to provide just that impetus.

The proposed rule provides Florida courts with the vehicle by which to
finally abandon the joint interest test of Osceola Groves, 227 even in those cases

which involve allegations of fraud. The public policy reasons for allowing
widespread enforcement of the rights of defrauded persons make a case like
219. There are numerous articles which critique the federal practice under rule 23. See
generally Handler, supra note 4; Landers, supra note 5.
220. See text accompanying notes 83-91 supra.
221. See text accompanying notes 92-110 supra.
222. See text accompanying notes 59-63 supra.
223. See Note, supra note 29, at 1366-71.
224. See text accompanying notes 64-91 supra.
225. See text accompanying notes 59-63 supra.
226. See notes 92-93 supraand accompanying text.
227. See text accompanying notes 70-73 supra.
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Osceola Groves ripe for class treatment. In Osceola Groves, all plaintiff class
members were allegedly defrauded by the same or similar representatives in the
same manner and had signed the same or similar sale and leaseback agreements. Reliance 228 and the amount of damages 2 9were the only individual issues
subject to litigation. The rule proposed in this article would allow the court to
consider the substantive fairness and logistical problems of litigating the class
members' claims without applying the incongruous joint interest test 2 0 or
even attempting to determine if the nature of the individual claims warranted
fitting each of them into an artificial category. 231
The proposed rule would also allow Florida courts to avoid the unduly
limiting effects of the community of interest theory.232 The rejection of a class
action in Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Wilson 2 33 is proof of the
intellectual limitations placed on a court's class action analysis by the community of interest theory. 234 Southern Bell involved a putative class action by
two telephone subscribers on behalf of themselves and all other telephone subscribers who, through no fault of their own, lost telephone service for a period
of twenty-four hours. The analytical structure of the Third District Court of
Appeal's opinion was sound in its attempt to analyze the issues to be litigated.
The focus of this analysis, however, was not the commonality of the litigated
issues, but rather the lack of the internal homogeneity in the class. In denying
class status, the court was impressed with the factual differences among the
potential class members rather than with the identity of issues relating to the
interruption of telephone service.235 This is characteristic of a court conditioned
to search for an internal cohesion among the class members. More importantly,
the court dismissed as irrelevant the public service which would be served by
the class litigation. 2 36 Under the proposed rule, however, the Southern Bell
court would be required to consider the consistency of class treatment by evaluating the substantive policies underlying the cause of action.
Arguably, Osceola Groves and Southern Bell would have been certified as
class actions under the original rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
228. The court's opinion in Osceola Groves is not clear as to the manner and form of the
misrepresentations. It is mere supposition as to the susceptibility of the issue of reliance to
common proof. 78 So. 2d at 700.
229. The court in Osceola Groves relied heavily on the choice of remedies as a reason to
deny class treatment. The court failed to find a common ground between the two plaintiffs
upon which they could join in building a single action. 78 So. 2d at 703. This diversity in
remedies could be handled by subclassing.
230. See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
231. See note 116 supra.
232. See text accompanying notes 51-53 & 64-91 supra.
233. 305 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974).
234. See text accompanying notes 64-77 supra.
235. The court's opinion does not reflect whether the telephone service interruptions
were alleged to be a result of a single catastrophic incident or whether there were numerous
unrelated interruptions. The opinion merely concentrated on noting that the proposed class
would encompass commercial and residential subscribers located in rural and urban areas,
without indicating how these differences would affect the issues to be litigated or without
considering subclasses. 305 So. 2d at 304.
236. Id.
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Although this would seem to indicate that Florida could expand use of the class

action device by adopting the current rule 23, a new approach is mandated in
light of the extensive criticism of the federal rule.2 3 7 The proposed rule is not
238 It allows
encumbered by a legacy of artificial classifications or categories.
courts the latitude necessary for making the practical decisions inherent in class
action determinations while giving definitive guidelines for making those determinations. This structure is essential for a rule premised on the substantive
2
theory of class actions. 39
The proposed rule is more expansive than present Florida law because it
relies on the substantive theory as its primary source of justification. The consent theory provisions of required notice and the right to opt out are not
present.24 0 Gases premised on the community of interest theory are, of course,
included under the new rule. However, the proposal does not require the community of interest demanded by the present rule 1.220 of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure, nor does it attempt to develop the complex federal rule
1
scheme of overlapping categories in an attempt to "type" the classes.24
The proposal provides four prerequisites to the maintenance of a class
action. Those prerequisites can be applied to any situation to determine
whether a class action is proper. The remainder of the proposed rule establishes an orderly procedure for determining if the four prerequisites for the
class exist. A series of steps which necessitate active judicial involvement must
be followed until the propriety of the class action is determined. After this
determination is made, the courts are required to more closely monitor the
litigation to be certain the decision was correct.
The notice provisions of the proposed rule may be somewhat controversial.
The Florida supreme court has held that due process requires individualized
notice to those class members who can be identified through reasonable effort.242 As noted earlier, this holding was the result of an overly broad reading
of the United States Supreme Court opinion in Eisen.2 43 Under the proposed
rule, only defendant class members have an absolute right to notice. The remaining notice provisions are discretionary, except for special circumstances
2
noted in subsection (e). "
A deprivation of a property right or personal liberty is required to violate
due process. While notice can be such a right, an adverse class judgment deprives members of a plaintiff class of the right to relitigate a claim previously
tried in the class suit. This results only in the loss of the right to maintain the
action individually. An unrealized right of action, however, has never been
237. Handler, supranote 4, at 8-12; Landers, supranote 5, at 842-50.
238. Both original rule 23 and its successor have been plagued with analytical difficulties
caused by the classification systems which are the cornerstones of the respective versions of
the rule. See note 45 supra.
239. See text accompanying notes 59-63 supra.
240. See text accompanying notes 54-58, 186-204 & 211-218 supra.
241. See notes 45 & 116 supra.
242. See text accompanying notes 186-204 supra.
243. See notes 184-197 supra and accompanying text.
244. Subsection (e) applies only in plaintiff class action cases in which the trial is
bifurcated and the defendant is held liable.
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thought to be property in the constitutional sense, and the remedy provided by
the class action provides a constitutionally significant protection of the underlying substantive claim.245

Even if the denial of access to relitigate the claim were held to provide a
basis for claiming due process rights, a requirement of notice would not necessarily follow. When a class judgment is collaterally attacked, the court's inquiry
is whether the class members' interests have been protected by the class representative and not whether notice has been given.246 Due process requires
effective representation; notice, and particularly individualized notice, is one
of several methods which can further that goal. Most cases which have held
that notice and hearing are constitutionally mandated involve defendants or
others who are bound by coercive court orders. 247 Recognizing this broad distinction between the effects of litigation on plaintiffs and defendants, the
proposed rule provides for mandatory notice to defendant classes. There is
usually social utility in promoting the use of the class action device by plaintiff's
classes. The debilitating effects of mandatory notice requirements and its concomitant costs 248 serve as ample social justification for leaving the provision of

notice to the discretion of the court, except in limited circumstances.
ProposedRule 1.220
(a) Prerequisites to a class action: One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties if
(1) The class is so numerous that complete joinder or intervention is impracticable, and
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class which
will substantially resolve the majority of the issues to be litigated in the action and the remaining individual issues are
not too numerous for practical resolution in the litigation,
and
(3) the representative parties have the incentive and ability to
fairly and adequately represent the absent class members, and
(4) a class action is preferable to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
(b) Class consideration: The action may be maintained only if the court
finds that the prerequisites under subsection (a) have been satisfied.
Among the matters which the court shall consider to determine whether
the action may proceed as a class action are:
(1) The impracticability of litigating the issues not common to
the class.
(2) The consistency of class treatment with the substantive policies underlying the cause(s) of action.
245. See, e.g., Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U.S. 516, 532 (1907) (representation by corporation sufficient protection of stockholder's rights).
246. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. at 42-43.
247. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971) (due process litigation has
typically involved the rights of defendants). See also North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972); Lynch v. Household Fin. Co., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin.
Corp. of Bayview, 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
248. See notes 207-208 supra and accompanying text.
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(3) The interest by members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of the separate actions.
(4) The impracticality or inefficiency of prosecuting or defending
separate actions.
(5) The difficulties likely to be encountered in the management
of a class action.
(c) Initial hearings: Within sixty (60) days after the commencement of
an action brought as a class action, the class proponent must request an
initial hearing in which the court shall consider:
(1) Motion(s) to dismiss the class action on the basis that the allegations of the complaint, if taken as true, cannot support
the class allegations.
(2) Status of settlement negotiations, if any.
(3) Discovery schedule on information needed to determine if the
action can properly be maintained as a class action.
(4) Any other preliminary matters the court deems necessary to
aid in the determination of the propriety of maintaining the
case as a class action.
(d) Subsequent hearings: After the initial hearing the court shall schedule as many preliminary hearings as necessary to allow the court to receive information relevant to the maintenance of the case as a class
action. At any time after the initial hearing the class opponent(s) may
move to strike the class allegations on the grounds that the discovery
reveals there is in fact no adherence to the class requirements. After the
court, in the exercise of sound discretion, has determined whether the
case is properly maintainable as a class action, it shall enter an order
either striking the class allegations or dearly defining the class membership. An order under this section may be conditional or altered or
amended before the decision on the merits.
(e) Fair and Adequate Representation; Notice: It shall be the responsibility of the court to ensure that the class representatives fairly and adequately represent the interest of the absent class members as provided in
subsection (a)(3). To aid in this determination the court may provide for
reasonable notice of the pendency of the action provided.
(1) Plaintiff class members shall be notified in the most reasonable and economical manner under the circumstances as to
the pendency of the action after the initial hearing in subsection (b) if the court determines that notice is necessary to aid
in the determination of the propriety of the case as a class
action. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit the court from requiring individualized notice where
reasonable if in the exercise of its sound discretion the court
determines that such notice is necessary to ensure that the representatives fairly and adequately represent the absent class
members.
(2) Defendant class members shall be notified in the best available manner under the circumstances, including individual
notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.
(3) In the case of compromise or dismissal, the class members
shall be notified in the most reasonable and economical manner under the circumstances. A class action shall not be
compromised or dismissed without the approval of the court,
which shall be granted only after the class members have been
given a reasonable opportunity to comment on the compromise or dismissal.
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The notice under subsections (1) and (2) shall be done at the expense of the class proponent. Notice under subsection (3) shall be done
at the expense of the class opponent.
(f) Bifurcation: In plaintiff class actions if the court determines during
the pretrial proceedings that each class member's proof of damages must
be made at trial for reasons of statutory or constitutional policy, the
court shall:
(1) Litigate liability and damage issues separately if it does not
impair the constitutional rights of any party, and
(2) if liability is found against the defendant(s), the defendant(s)
shall be required to identify from its business records or other
reasonably available sources those persons likely to have been
injured and the extent of their injury, and
(3) the best available notice including individual notice to those
who have been identified shall be sent to the class members,
notifying them of the liability verdict and their right to make
a claim for damages.
The steps set forth in subdivisions (2) and (3) shall be undertaken at
the defendant(s) expense.
(g) Partial class actions: When appropriate,
(1) An action may be brought or maintained as a class action
with respect to particular issues, or
(2) a class may be divided into subclasses in order to protect
disparate interests among class members.
(h) Orders in Conduct of Class Actions: In the conduct of class actions
the court may make appropriate orders:
(1) Determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument;
(2) allowing intervenors and imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors;
(3) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and
that the action proceed accordingly;
(4) directing that a money judgment favorable to the class be
paid either in one sum, whether forthwith or within such
period as the court may fix, or in such installments as the
court may specify;
(5) dealing with similar procedural matters.
The orders may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time
to time.
(i) Judgment: The judgment in an action maintained as a class action,
whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those
whom the court finds to be members of the class.
(j) Attorney's fees: If a judgment in an action maintained as a class
action is rendered in favor of the class, the court in its discretion may
award attorneys' fees to the representatives of the class based on the
reasonable value of legal services rendered and if justice requires allow
recovery of the amount awarded from the opponent of the class.
CONCLUSION

The class action device is a procedure which has tremendous potential for
aiding courts and society in implementing prevailing social policy. That
potential has not been realized in Florida. For the class action to be a useful
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tool, the judiciary must undertake the responsibility to assume a more active
role than is ordinarily required in a normal bipolar lawsuit. This judicial
activism is justified by the social benefits to be realized from the increased
enforcement of the substantive policies underlying state laws. The rule proposed in this article would allow Florida courts to consider the scope and
magnitude of the litigation in a more disciplined fashion before reaching decisions on the merits. If enhanced benefits are to be realized, the traditional
concept of judicial restraint as manifested by adherence to the anachonistic
community of interest standard must be altered, and the proposed rule provides the structure for that alteration.
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